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I. Introduction
There is no doubt that implementation of existing international human rights 
norms is currendy more important than adopting new international human rights 
instruments. The process of implementation should go on both international and 
municipal levels and should first and foremost concern the application of 
international human rights norms in domestic court practice. It is in national courts 
that millions of human fates are faced each day on the whole planet, and these 
millions of people look with expectations not only at their national constitutions 
and laws, but also — and sometimes even with greater hope — at international human 
rights standards that should be observed. If not, they may have international courts 
in reserve which though not as quickly as is desired might bring justice home. 
Although the international courts significance “is pale compared with that of their 
domestic counterparts, such tribunals offer a convenient point of departure towards 
an understanding of international law and process.”1 The European Court of
1 D. h  Vagts, H. H. Kob, H. J. Steiner, Steiner, Vagts and Koh’s Transnational Legal Problems, Materials 
and Texts, 4th ed., 1994,227.'
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Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) is one of such courts at which many unjustly 
indicted by domestic courts expect to find justice. All Ukraine is now following 
Lutsenko vs. Ukraine and Tymoshmko vs. Ukraine cases in the ECHR with the majority 
having no doubts that the decision would be against Ukraine. This situation could 
have been avoided if domestic courts in Ukraine had applied norms of the 1950 
Convention for the Protection of .Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter the European Convention). 
Though individuals of many states may exercise their right to international 
judicial defence, many aspects of human rights and fundamental freedoms remain 
in die inner competence of states, and guaranteeing of even international human 
rights standards remains mostly an internal affair of a state. In this respect the role 
of national courts is crucial as they play the most important role in enforcement of 
law. As Igor Lukashuk stated this role is determined by the place of a court within 
the system of bodies of state power, the general position of a state towards 
international law; and by the level of international legal consciousness of society.2 
In this chapter I will analyze theoretical aspects of correlation of international 
and municipal law and problems of implementation of international treaties in 
domestic legal order with main attention paid to municipal practice regarding 
application of international human rights instruments by domestic courts. Special 
emphasis will be on the implementation of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide Convention), 
and the European Convention by domestic courts. The former Soviet Union 
republics' case law will be given main attention. 
I. General Problems of Implementation of International Law 
in the Internal Legal Order 
1. Application of International Law in the Municipal Law Systems 
Though international human rights are concentrated in international norms, 
procedures and institutions, they are also directly connected with domestic law 
systems as international treaties become valid in states due to national, laws on 
implementation, and human rights protection is committed primarily by national 
courts. As Volodymyr Denysov observes, ''it is in national law system that a great 
mass of abstract norms of international law obtains real vital meaning both for the 
state and for the international community as a whole".3 
The issue of correlation of international and domestic law is complicated and 
well-researched by scholars. Different scholarly opinions for many decades have 
ranged "from the view, at one extreme, that international law is not law at all but 
mere rules of international morality, through varying version of dualism or 
pluralism, to a monistic conception, at other extreme, that international law dictates 
the content of national law.4 
a) Monistic Concepts 
The essence of monistic concepts lies in recognition of unity of both 
international and national law. Both of them are considered to be parts of one law 
system. However, some adherents of monistic concepts support primacy of state 
law, others — primacy of international law. The latter one has been more substantially 
grounded in international law doctrine. As fairly stated by J.G. Starke, "the thesis of 
the ultimate primacy of State law breaks down in two crucial cases: (a) If 
international law drew its validity only from a State Constitution, it would necessarily 
cease to be in force once the Constitution on which its authority rested disappeared. 
But nothing is more certain than that the valid operation of international law is 
independent of change or abolition of Constitutions, or of revolutions.... (b) The 
entry of new States into the international Society. It is well established that 
international law binds the new State without its consent, and such consent if 
expressed is merely declaratory of the true legal position."5 It definitely refers to 
generally recognized principles of international law and international customary 
law, as international treaties need states' consent for their application. 
b) Dualist Theories 
The dualist theory which prevails among lawyers was concisely formulated by 
L. Oppenheim: "Neither can International Law per se create or invalidate Municipal 
haw, nor can Municipal Law per se create or invalidate International Law. 
International Law and Municipal Law are in fact two totally and essentially different-
bodies of law which have nothing in common except that they are both branches 
— but separate branches — of the tree of law. Of course, it is possible for the 
Municipal Law of an individual State by custom or by statute to adopt rules of 
International Law as part of the law of the land, and then the respective rules of 
International Law become ipso facto rules of Municipal Law."6 Last decades were 
marked by greater interest among western international lawyers to dualist 
conception and deviation from the monistic theory. As Ian Brownlie wrote 
(analysing Hersch Lauterpacht's monistic theory), monism is antipathetic to the 
legal corollaries of the existence of sovereign states, and reduces municipal law to 
the status of pensioner of international law.7 
W. Friedmann, also having in mind the adherent of monistic theory H. 
Lauterpachr, noted that followers of monistic view try to prove, despite of the facts 
that demonstrate the opposite, that international law as such incorporates into the 
English law8 Q. Wright wrote that it is necessary ro accept the dualistic point of 
view. International courts apply international law, national courts — national law.9 
There exist different dualistic concepts of correlation of international and 
municipal law Under the positivist theory, "the rules of international law cannot 
directly and ex proprio vigore be applied within the municipal sphere by State Courts 
or otherwise; in order to be so applied such rules must undergo a process of specific 
adoption by, or specific incorporation into, municipal law. Since, according to 
positivist theory, international law and State law constitute two strictly separate and 
structurally different systems, the former cannot impinge upon State law unless the 
latter, a logically complete system, allows its constitutional machinery to be used 
for that purpose."10 Thus under positivist approach international law may not 
interfere into municipal law unless the latter allows it. 
Under another dualistic conception there goes transformation of international 
law into domestic law. Such a conception has been adopted in Finland where an 
international treaty has to be "transformed" into national law to become law applicable 
in domestic courts. As M. Pellonpaa writes, "since customary international law can 
be left aside, the influence of international law on domestic law is then a question of 
the effectiveness of the transformation of treaties. In regard to Finland . . . they are 
transformed (or incorporated) as such into Finish law by what are called "bianco" 
enactments; i.e. pieces of legislation (or administrative acts) in which the treaty is simply 
given the status of national law. The hierarchical position of the municipal norms 
thus produced depends on the contents of the treaty in question. If the instrument 
"belongs to die sphere of legislation", which primarily means that the treaty provisions 
deviate from some existing act of Parliament, they also have to be transformed 
through a statute enacted by Parliament. Moreover, if the conflict between the treaty 
and the domestic law affects some provisions of constitutional nature, a special 
procedure for constitutional deviations may be needed also for the enactment of the 
"bianco statute"... In practice many treaties, for example the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, have been transformed both by a statute and a decree: those provisions which belong to the "sphere of legislation" are then in force on the statute level,therest on the inferior level of an administrative decree.11 
The conception of transformation of international legal norms into domestic 
legal norms has been widely researched in international law doctrine in light of 
correlation of international and national law. It is evident that the theory of 
"transformation" as "a way of enforcing international law by means of enacting 
domestic normative acts by a state . . . to provide fulfilling her international 
obligation"12, as a norm creative process correctly reveals the essence of formal 
legal correlation of two law systems, however the term "transformation" is 
disputable. Thus A. Khachaturian considers that this term is absolutely inadequate 
to the process that goes on while transformation. Norms of two law systems cannot 
transform into each other because of their absolutely different nature and 
destination. In any case they remain the norms of the law system in which they 
appeared.13 V.V. Rudnitskiy is of die same view as "transformation" literally means 
conversion (reorganization) of international legal norms which does not happen. 
"In fact there goes national legal reception of the main content of international 
legal norm which is often accompanied by its addition, concretization and 
adaptation to conditions of a new law system and society. This process is not 
enforcing of an international legal norm in a strict legal sense.14 
The transformation theory has been opposed by the delegation theory 
according to which "there is delegated to each State Constitution by constitutional 
rules of international law, the right to determine when the provisions of a treaty or 
Convention are to come into force and the manner in which they are to be 
embodied in State law"1"' By constitutional rules of international law the generally 
recognized principles and norms are meant. 
Some states may be monistic in relations to international customary law (i.e. open 
to its application) and dualistic in relation to a treaty (i.e. closed to its direct 
application).1'' In the USA such an approach was confirmed already in the decision 
of the Supreme Court of the USA in 1900 in Tlx Paquete Habana Case, where it was 
ruled that if there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be made to the customs and usages of civilized nations.17 
Along with the above mentioned monistic and dualist theories there exists 
another modern doctrine of international law based upon theories of 
"harmonization of two law system", "priority of international law over domestic 
law" or "primacy of international law" which as V. Denysov writes "reject monistic 
and dualist theories that may not be recognized in the existing conditions of unity 
of international community approach to interaction of international and domestic 
law."18 This is a doctrine of parallel application of international and domestic legal 
norms which is mostly used in newly independent states undergoing transformation 
of their legal systems from monistic to dualist ones. 
2. Application of International Treaties 
in the Domestic Legal Order 
The issue of application of international law in the domestic legal order includes 
three aspects: 1) application of international treaties; 2) application of international 
customary norms; 3) application of decisions of international judicial and control 
bodies in national jurisprudence. State practice of application of international law 
norms depends upon law system in general (Anglo-Saxon, continental, practice of 
the USA and some other states which have their specific features) and upon state's 
law on implementation. 
All international human rights instruments aim first and foremost at ensuring 
the rights incorporated in them at the municipal level, not that much (though 
naturally additionally to) in judicial and control bodies at the international level. It 
goes without saying that efficacy of international human rights instruments is 
determined by their observance and application in national legal systems. This, in 
its turn, depends upon the state legislation and die application of international legal 
norms by national courts. On the one hand, under the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, the state may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (article 27).19 On die other hand, 
the Permanent Court of International justice and its successor the International 
Court of Justice have usually reached their solutions after very careful examination 
of the relevant municipal law. 
Ratification or other means of expressing state's consent to be bound by a 
treaty7 do not always mean its automatic application in the domestic legal order and 
states' practices differ. Scholars (in Ukraine and abroad) have widely researched 
implementation of international legal acts into national law systems,2" however it 
would be interesting to compare such state practices of implementation of 
international human rights norms into case law, in particular, in such states as the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland, the USA, The 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine which represent different law systems and in which 
different means of implementation are used. The concept of "case law" will not 
be analyzed here and the broad definition of court practice will be used to determine 
the results of activity of all levels of court system in a state. 
a) British Practice 
As is well known court practice of states concerning application of international 
treaties depends upon different factors.21 Thus courts of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland refer only to those international legal acts which 
are incorporated into municipal law by adopting relevant (proper) domestic acts. 
This is the result of the British practice as to treaties conditioned "by the 
constitutional principles governing the relations between die Executive (that is to 
say, the Crown) and Parliament."22 Since the power to make and to ratify treaties 
belongs to the Crown, any treaty which requires a change in English law in order 
to make that law conform with the provisions of the treaty, and thus ensure that 
those provisions are cognizable and. enforceable in the English courts, requires that 
die necessary legislation be enacted. 23 
However most treaties, as for example treaties concerning individual rights of 
British citizens need to be approved by the Parliament with the relative act. The 
British court practice has also preserved some elements of the incorporation 
doctrine concerning the customary international law which are revealed, firstly, in 
"a rule of construction" and, secondly, in "a rule of evidence." Under the rule of 
construction Parliamentary acts should be interpreted in such a way as not to conflict 
with international law. There is a presumption that the Parliament should not violate 
international law. Under the rule of evidence, international law does not need to be 
proved as foreign law by an expertise or in other way. Nevertheless where "a Statute 
contains provisions which are unambiguously inconsistent with those of an earlier 
treaty, a British municipal Court must apply the Statute in preference to the treaty."24 
The UN Human Rights Committee while following how states—members of 
the UN comply with international human rights obligations often criticizes them for 
the absence of norms in domestic law which would ensure the rights recognized by 
ICCPR and hence the inability for their citizens to apply to domestic courts for their 
protection. In its Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom's fifth periodic 
report, the Human Rights Committee, while welcoming the incorporation of many 
ICCPR rights into the domestic legal order through the Human Rights Act 1998, 
regretted the failure to accord the same level of protection to other Covenant rights, 
including the provisions of article 26 on prohibiting any form of discrimination.2' 
As T. Choudhury and G. Moon point out, the combination of the common law; the 
Human Rights Act and anti-discrimination laws26 ensure that there is substantia] 
compliance with article 26 of ICCPR. 'The protection for equality before the law 
meets Article 26 obligations. But significant gaps remain between domestic law and 
Article 26 in the equal protection of the law and most notably in the prohibition of 
discrimination.27 For this the incorporation of a general principle of equality in a 
comprehensive unified code is proposed so that there is an overriding principle of 
UK domestic law that no unjustified discrimination is permissible on the foundation 
provided by article 26 of the ICCPR.2 8 At the same time, the Committee notes that 
the obligation of states parties to "respect and to ensure the rights recognized in the 
Covenant" does not go so far as requiring a state to incorporate the treaty into 
domestic law2'' 
K. Monaghan also indicates the inconsistent protection against: discrimination on 
the grounds of race, sex and disablement in the British antidiscrimination legislation, 
and absolute lack of protection against: discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, age, language; in the Northern Ireland — lack of protection against 
discrimination on the basis of religious and political opinion.30 KMonaghan suggests 
a way of improving domestic antidiscrimination protection through application of 
article 14 of die European Convention, which may help in filling the gap in national 
antidiscrimination legislation and liberalize the definition of the concept of 
"discrimination".31 However Protocol 12 to the European Convention which foresees 
the right to freedom from any form of discrimination, in particular by any public 
body remains unratified by majority of states — members of the Council of Europe, 
including Great Britain. 
b) USA Practice 
As different from British practice concerning treaties American practice depends 
not upon coordination (agreement) between legislative and executive power, but upon 
provisions of the USA Constitution which provide that "treaties are the supreme 
law of the land" (article VI, para 2) as well as upon a distinction drawn by American 
Courts between "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties,32 and judges have 
to enforce "self-executing" treaties even if there are provisions in the Constitution or 
other laws which contradict them. That distinguishes American practice as to treaties 
from Great Britain and Ireland's practice where international legal acts may be enforced 
only after their incorporation into national legislation through adopting national acts. 
As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out in the Case of the US Supreme Court 
Foster v. Net/son, "A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a 
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, die object to be accomplished, 
especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by 
the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States 
a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law 
of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to 
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any 
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract — 
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses 
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute 
the contract, before it can become a rule for the Court."33 The same thought was 
expressed by Justice Miller a half century later, in the Head Money Cases: "A treaty 
is primarily a conttact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement 
of its provisions on the interest and the honour of the governments which are 
parties of it.... But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights 
upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits 
of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable 
of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country."3'1 
As was pointed out in the judgement of the California Supreme Court in Sei Fujii 
Case, drawing a distinction between "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties 
the courts determine the intention of the signatory parries as it is expressed in the 
terms of the treaty and the surrounding circumstances. A self-executing treaty is one 
which does not in the view of American Courts expressly or by its nature require 
legislation to make it operative within the municipal field, while non-self-executing 
treaties are not binding upon American Courts until the necessary legislation is 
enacted.3'' In this case it was held that the human rights provisions of the UN Charter 
were not self-executing but the provisions relative to the privileges and immunities 
of the United Nations were. Thus for example article 104 of the Charter: "The 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity 
as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purpose," 
and article 105: "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes" are 
formulated in clear and accurate language that testifies to the intention to create 
provisions tihat act without additional legislature. These provisions were recognized 
self-executing in Curran v. City of New York Case36. Another example of enforcing self-
executing international norms on human rights is the US Supreme Court Case Roper 
v. Simmons, in which death penalty was recognized disproportionately cruel and unusual 
punishment for criminals younger dian 18 years old,37 which corresponds to article 6 
(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) 
that states: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age..." 
c) Continental State Practices 
What concerns states with continental law system, there is no uniform practice 
on the application of treaties within their domestic sphere. Each state has its own 
peculiarities in questions of legislative approval of treaty provisions, promulgation, 
and so on. J.G. Starke gives examples of Austria, German Federal Republic, Belgium 
and France. While in Austria "treaties automatically bind the Administration without 
publication, but need to be gazetted in order to affect rights of public in general," 
in the German Federal Republic courts will, like American courts, give effect to 
self-executing tteaties. In Belgium, "legislative enactment or legislative approval is 
necessary for almost all treaties, particularly those which affect the status of private 
citizens. As to conflicts between the provisions of treaties and earlier or later 
Statutes, it is only in relatively few countries that the superiority of the treaty in this 
regard is established. France is a case in point, for if a treaty has been duly ratified 
in accordance with law, French tribunals, both judicial and administrative, will give 
effect to it, notwithstanding a conflict with internal legislation.38 
In some modern constitutions there are norms providing for international law 
being treated as an integral part of municipal law. Thus article 25 of the Basic Law 
for the Federal Republic of Germany {The West German Republic) states that "the 
general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall 
take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants 
of the federal territory."39 
Law system of the former USSR was characterized by a dualist concept; however 
under the pressure of needs for international relations the partial implementation of 
international norms into domestic law was recognized.40 It is understandable that in 
years of "cold war" the USA and the USSR for different reasons have not accepted 
the idea of direct application by national courts of the international law norms 
regulating relations between people and thek own governments. However after the 
end of "cold war", as L.F Damrosh writes, it's time to ask if former rivals are at last 
ready to fully implement international human rights law in their national courts 41 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the former Soviet republics went different 
ways regarding application of international law. G. Danilenko groups Commonwealth 
of Independent States (hereinafter CIS) countries into three different types according 
to the provisions included into their Constitutions concerning international law, usually 
tteaty law: 1) in which international law is part of the law of the land (Russia, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Tajikistan, theoretically Belarus); 2) in which 
constitutions declare that international law forms part of the law of the land, but fail 
to establish the hierarchical status of international rules in the domestic legal system 
(Ukraine, Kirgliizstan); 3) in which only vague reference to international law is 
incorporated (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan).42 In accordance with this classification 
practices of application of the European Convention by domestic courts of CIS 
countries may be also divided in three relative groups. 
Under article 15 (4) of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation: "The 
universally-recognised norms of international law and international treaties and 
agreements of die Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. 
If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation establishes other 
rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be 
applied."43 However as G.M. Danilenko points out, the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation quite often does not distinguish between different by their legal 
nature categories of international norms and combines under the ambiguous formula 
of "international treaties" both legally binding norms and recommendations of 
international organizations".'14 
As in the USA, in Russian Federation there is distinction between self-executing 
and non-self-executing international treaties though these terms themselves are not 
used in Russian legislation. Under article 5 (3) of die Federal Law on "International 
Treaties of die Russian Federation", "die provisions of the officially published treaties 
of the Russian Federation which do not require the promulgation of domestic acts 
for application, shall operate in the Russian Federation directly. In order to effectuate 
other provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation, the relevant legal 
acts shall be adopted." Along with this, the 2003 Russian Supreme Court Ruling No 
5 "On application by courts of general jurisdiction of the commonly recognized 
principles and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the 
Russian Federation" pays attention of judges to the fact that "the consent for the 
international treaty to be mandatory for the Russian Federation should be expressed 
in the form of a federal law, provided that this treaty stipulates other rules than the 
federal laws (Item 4 of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Items 
1 and 2 of Article 5, Article 14, Item 1 «a» of Article 15 of the of the Federal Law 
"On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation", Item 2 of Article 1 of the 
Civil and Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, Item 3 of Article 1 of the 
Criminal and Procedural Code of the Russian Federation).43 
As G. Danilenko writes, while the Russian Constitutional Court refused to draw 
any distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, the legislature 
took the initiative.46 Modern Russian conception of self-executing treaties is 
formulated in part 1 of the 1994 Civil Code of die Russian Federation, article 7 (2) 
of which declares that "The international treaties of the Russian Federation shall 
be direcdy applied toward the relations, indicated in Items 1 and 2 of Article 2 of 
the present Code, with the exception of the cases, when it follows from the 
international treaty that for it to be applied, a special intra-state act shall be issued. 
If the rules, laid down in the international treaty of the Russian Federation, differ 
from those stipulated by the civil legislation, the rules of the international treaty 
shall be applied."47 
e) Ukraine's Practice 
While the Russian Federation, declared universally-recognised norms of 
international law and international treaties an integral part of her legal system, article 
9 (2) of the Constitution of Ukraine lays down that "International treaties in force, 
consented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as binding, shall be an integral part 
of the national legislation of Ukraine."48 There is a definite advantage of the Russian 
provision on norms of international law and international treaties being part of 
domestic law system over the Ukrainian one on international treaties being an 
integral part of the national legislation. The generally recognized principles and 
norms of international law are mentioned only in the context of foreign political 
activity of Ukraine (article 18 of the Ukraine's Constitution). In article 22 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine it is stated that "the constitutional rights and freedoms 
shall be guaranteed and shall not be abolished" (not all rights in general), and they 
shall not be diminished by an adoption of new laws or by introducing amendments 
to the effective laws. As M. Koziubra points out, more substantial constitutional 
grounds for priority of norms of the international treaties ratified by the Verkhovna 
Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine concerning human rights and freedoms over norms 
of national legislation of Ukraine are in provisions of article 8 (1) of the 
Constitution which establishes the principle of the rule of law, in case subjective 
and objective law is not opposed.49 
Ukraine as well as many other states — former Soviet Union Republics 
recognized the principle of priority of international law over domestic law. However 
after adopting the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine this priority of international norms 
over norms of national legislation is questioned.5" Under article 19 (2) of the 2004 
Law of Ukraine on International Treaties, if an international treaty which became 
valid in accordance with due procedure establishes other rules than those which 
are provided in the relative legislative act of Ukraine, the norms of an international 
treaty shall be applied.51 Article 9 (1) of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that 
"International treaties in force, consented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as 
binding, shall be an integral part of the national legislation of Ukraine."32 Such a 
provision is disputable as an international treaty may not be a part of legislation, 
radier of the legal system of the state in general. 
At the same time, article 9 (2) of the Constitution of Ukraine lays down that 
"Conclusion of international treaties, contravening the Constitution of Ukraine, 
shall be possible only after introducing relevant amendments to the Constitution 
of Ukraine," which establishes supremacy of the Constitution of Ukraine over 
international treaties. The Supreme Court of Ukraine has interpreted this norm 
in its Ruling No 9 of 1 November 1996: "A court may not: apply a law which 
regulates legal relations under stipulation in a different way than an international 
treaty. At the same time international treaties are applied if they do not contradict 
to the Constitution of Ukraine."53 However the place of these treaties is not clearly 
defined — are they superior to all laws, both earlier and later, or only to earlier laws? 
Even decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine do not answer this 
question definitely. In its 1998 Decision on the interpretation of the term 
"legislation" the Constitutional Court of Ukraine placed legislative acts in such a 
sequence: laws of Ukraine, international treaties of Ukraine consented by the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as binding, decrees of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine, decrees of the President of Ukraine, decrees and rulings of the Cabinet 
of Ministers, adopted in their discretion and in accordance with the Constitution 
and laws of Ukraine.3'4 
Meanwhile Ukraine is being criticized by the UN Human Rights Committee 
for inconsistency between her obligations under the ICCPR and national law. The 
Committee expressed concern on Ukraine's fifth periodic report, in particular, 
because in case of collision of human rights under the ICCPR and inner 
legislation the latter might have priority. As noted by members of the Committee, 
it was not clear from the text of the Constitution of Ukraine if norms of the 
Covenant might be directly applied like the provisions of the Constitution, i.e. if 
they might be directly enforced by courts. The members of the Committee asked 
concrete questions as to the number of court cases in which there was reference 
to articles of the ICCPR. Though under article 9 of the Ukrainian Constitution 
the Covenant is a part of the national legislation, it has not (as members of the 
Committee stated) obtained the higher status for ensuring its priority in case of 
conflict with the Ukrainian legislation. The attempts of the Ukrainian 
Ombudsman to amend this article of the Constitution were greeted b the 
Committee.55 
In the process of judicial enforcement of international human rights treaties 
the Ukrainian courts, as different, for example, from the American courts, do not 
thus far draw a distinction between self-executing and non self-executing treaties as 
the Ukrainian legislation itself does not yet regulate establishing such self-
executiveness of international treaties. While Ukraine is in the initial stage of 
implementing process, when the cases of application of international norms by 
domestic courts are not: numerous, it might be too early to speak about such 
distinction. On the one hand, research on the issue of self-executing and non self-
executing treaties is highly needed."'6 On the other hand, such direct application of 
international norms is doubted by some scholars. As V. Denysov writes, interaction 
of international norms and domestic law from practical point: of view requires 
application of international norms in such a way that they might be used in the 
legal system and first of all, when necessary, by national courts, and the ideology if 
international law does not connect the priority of international law with its 
immediate action, viewing such an approach as irrational."'7 
Moreover, there exists such state practice when international legal norms are 
used along with national law or as principles in light: of which the law norms are 
applied.58 As M. Selivon points out, the peculiar feature of the Ukrainian national 
legislation consisting of international treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding 
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is that its norms do not transform into new, 
merely national norms, but are realized independently, in some cases — together 
with a domestic legal act, adopted at the process of implementation of a treaty into 
the state legal system."59 As testified by Ukrainian judicial practice, the process of 
such parallel application of international human rights norms and national legal 
norms has already started in Ukraine. 
III. Application of the 1948 Convention for the Prevention of the 
Crime of Genocide by National Courts 
1. Domestic Courts Jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention 
The Genocide Convention includes the norm of judicial enforcement by means 
of national courts in case of committing a crime of genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit 
genocide, complicity in genocide — persons charged with any of these acts "shall be 
tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was 
committed..." (article VI).6 0 Thus it is interesting to analyze how states parties to the 
Genocide Convention in the territory of which these acts were committed follow the 
obligation to try perpetrators of genocide. States may and should held perpetrators 
of genocide responsible even without a relative norm in their national legislation. 
It is evident that the regimes who planned or organized genocides will never 
confront those responsible for genocides (Turkey; former Soviet Union, Cambodia 
under "Khmer Rouge, Sudan etc.). The new governments are quite often also 
unwilling or unable to provide justice. However at the end of XX beginning of XXI 
century in some states in the territory of which crimes of genocide were committed 
the governments changed and new governments wrere interested in punishing for 
genocide 
National courts in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Iraq, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and some other states, and in 2010 in Ukraine (Decree of the Kyiv 
Court of Appeal) based their decisions on judging for genocide, committed in their 
territory, either on national legislation, or Genocide Convention, or on both sources. 
National. Courts of Israel, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland also hold cases 
of genocide and took decisions on the basis of universal jurisdiction, thus filling 
the gaps in the Genocide Convention.61 The Convention itself does not include 
universal jurisdiction, though the draft Convention prepared by the UN Secretariat 
in 1947 stated that "The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any 
offender under this Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, 
irrespective of the nationality of the offender or of the place the offence has been 
committed."62 Nevertheless this draft article was not adopted by most states because 
of contradiction to "traditional principles of international law" and violation of 
"the sovereignty of states."6' 
In Adolf Eichmann case the district court of Israel rejecting the denial by the 
defendant of die jurisdiction of this court on the basis of the Genocide Convention 
referred to the 1951 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 
which the Court stated that "the principles underlying the Convention are principles 
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional 
obligation."64 
In some states, as for example in Rwanda, national courts have already taken 
thousands of decisions on judging for genocide on the basis of the Genocide 
Convention, in other states — only a few decisions. It is interesting that: in Rwanda 
where numerous charges of genocide were made the national legislation 
implementing the Genocide Convention was not adopted. That problem was 
regulated by a legislator in the Organic Law No 08/96 of 30 August 1996 on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide 
or Crimes against Humanity Committed since 1 October 1990. Article 1 (la) lays 
down that "The purpose of this organic law is the organization of criminal 
proceedings against persons who are accused of having since 1 October 1990, 
committed acts set out and sanctioned under the Penal Code and which constitute: 
a) either the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity as defined in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 
December 1948, in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and its additional protocols, as well as 
in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity of 26 November 1968.. ," 6 5 
The analysis of the national case law on the implementation of the Genocide 
Convention shows different ways states are following the obligation to punish for 
genocide. Some states have included articles on the crime of genocide into their 
national law, others have not done so. The last decades faced crucial changes in this 
respect. Thus the Code of Crimes against International Law was adopted in Germany 
in 2001; Canadian Parliament passed Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act 
(2000) which provide universal jurisdiction for crimes under international law including 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Before adopting this Act, under 
the Criminal Code of Canada the Canadian courts had jurisdiction on war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed outside Canada only if a person was in the 
territory of Canada after committing this act or omission.66 
Ukraine and some other former Soviet Union republics have also included the 
norm on responsibility for genocide in their new Criminal Codes. 
2. Baltic States Practice 
Among former Soviet Union republics courts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
applied norms of the international criminal law and charged those who deported 
population of diese countries in 1941 and in 1949 and took part in other mass 
repressions on accusation in crimes against humanity and/or genocide. It is interesting 
that in national legislation of one group of post-soviet states the norm on genocide 
was included in the same wording as in the Genocide Convention; other group of 
post-soviet states included it in somewhat changed wording than in international law 
Thus in the new Estonian Penal Code definition of the crime of 'genocide' includes 
among the protected groups the "groups offering resistance to the occupation regime 
or other social groups." The inclusion of "groups offering resistance to the occupation 
regime or other social groups" in the definition of "genocide" went further from the 
definition set out in the 1948 Genocide Convention. As Lauri Malksoo notes, this 
seems to confirm die international trend of including the "political groups" in the 
definition of 'genocide,' notwithstanding the restrictive definition of the 1948 
Genocide Convention.67 In particular, political groups were included in the. definition 
of genocide in Criminal Codes of France and Iithuania. 
Before adopting new Criminal Code in 2001, Estonian courts ruled their decisions 
on the basis of article 61 of the Criminal Code which was amended to the previous 
Estonian Criminal Code and was entitled "Climes against Humanity." Part 1 of article 
61 provides punishment widi the loss of freedom from eight until fifteen years or 
with the life sentence or with death penalty for committingg crimes against humanity'; 
including genocide, as these crimes are defined in norms of international law, i.e., for 
wilful acts which aimed to completely or partially destroy a national, ethnic, racial, 
religious group, a group offering resistance to the occupation regime or other social 
group, for killing a member of such group or inflicting upon him serious or very 
serious bodily or mental damage or for torturing him, for forced removal of cliildren, 
for the deportation or expulsion of the indigenous population during an armed attack, 
occupation or annexation, or the denial of their economic, political and social human 
rights or die stripping of such rights. Thus the definition of crimes against humanity 
in this article of the Estonian Criminal Code includes the crime of genocide and some 
of its acts as defined in the Genocide Convention. 
Part 2 of article 61 of the former Estonian Criminal Code lays down that "the 
representative of the state authorities, with whose approval the crimes mentioned 
in this article's first paragraph were committed, shall be punished due to his 
involvement as an accessory in accordance with § 17 para. 6." 
Several cases of Estonian courts concerned accusations on die bases of article 
61 of the Criminal Code of Estonia.68 The last deportation case which was analyzed 
by L. Malksoo has been the one against Mikhail Neverovski (born in 1920). The Parnu 
County Court started to hear his criminal case on 19 July 1999. According to the 
indictment, the defendant worked as an operative plenipotentiary of the N K V D in 
Parnu and participated in the deportation of March 1949. Thus, pursuant to the 
indictment, he had "caused, through his deliberate acts, the deportation of natives 
from the annexed Republic of Estonia with the purpose to destroy in part a national 
group which was offering resistance to the occupying power and a social group which 
was declared 'kulaks'." He was thus accused in having committed a crime under § 
61 (1) of the Estonian Criminal Code, whereas the indictment did not specify explicidy 
whether the crime was to be called "crime against humanity" or "genocide." Of more 
than a hundred victims, about sixty appeared in die courtroom. On 30 July 1999 the 
Parnu County Court found the defendant guilty under § 61'(1) of the Estonian 
Criminal Code, and sentenced him to four years in a closed prison69. The convicted 
appealed the judgement and on 1 November 1999 the Tallinn Circuit: Court relieved 
Neverovski from actual imprisonment and replaced the punishment with four years 
of imprisonment on a three year probationary period.'1' 
To some up, the Baltic states are following their obligation under the Genocide 
Convention to punish for the crime of genocide by national courts having extended 
the definition of genocide given in the Genocide Convention in their Criminal 
Codes. That, unfortunately, may not be said about other former Soviet Union 
republics in the territory of which genocide was committed. 
3. Ukraine's Experience 
In Ukraine the Ruling of the Kyiv Court of Appeals of 13th January 2010 on 
the Holodomor lays down that Judge of the Criminal Chamber of the Kyiv Court 
of Appeals carried out a preliminary examination of criminal case № 1-33/2010, 
initiated by the Security Service of Ukraine pursuant to section 1, Article 442 of 
the Criminal Code of Ukraine, based upon the fact of the crime of genocide 
committed in Ukraine during the years 1932-1933.71 The Ruling is based both upon 
article 442 of the new Penal Code of Ukraine which entered into force in 2001 and 
upon articles of the 1948 Genocide Convention, ratified by Ukraine on 22 July 
1954. However as different from the Baltic states the definition of genocide in 
article 442 of the Criminal Code absolutely corresponds to the definition of 
genocide in the Genocide Convention. 
Following the provisions of the Ukrainian legislation and the 1948 UN 
Convention, die Court confirmed the correct and legal balance of the position, 
according to which "the issue concerning the review of the factual circumstances of 
perpetrating the crime of genocide against a part of the Ukrainian national group, 
and the conclusions of the pre-trial investigation body thereon, and the closure of 
the case should be specifically decided by the court, in this case the Kyiv Court of 
Appeals." 
The Court also stressed that provisions set out in Article VI of the 1948 UN 
Convention exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of other countries in die criminal 
case of the Holodomor and require that die case be examined "by a competent 
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed." Thus, as die 
Kyiv Court of Appeal ruled, the decisions taken by the courts of other states, including 
the Russian Federation, in the capital of which — Moscow — in 1932-1933 a number 
of documents were adopted which led to the artificial famine (the Holodomor) in 
Ukraine as a means of perpetrating the crime of genocide against a part of the 
Ukrainian national group, would have no legal force, as diose courts would lack the 
relevant jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has used the reasoning of die pre-trial investigatory body 
with regard to the retroactive applicability of Article 442 of the Criminal Code of 
Ukraine to the period of the commission of the crime of genocide by means of the 
Holodomor of 1.932—1933 on the basis of provisions of domestic and international 
legislation, namely: 
• Article 49 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine under which the passage of time 
as a basis for waiver of criminal liability (as well as a basis for the establishment 
of the commission of a crime) "shall not: apply in the case of the commission 
of a crime against the peace and security of humanity as provided for in Articles 
437 through 439 and section 1, Article 442 of this Code;" 
• Article 442: 'Genocide", which is contained in Chapter XX of the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine: "Crimes against peace, humanity and international order;" 
• Article 7 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, dated November 4,1950, which provides that the 
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law "shall not prejudice the trial and 
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it 
was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations;" 
• The UN Convention "On the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity", dated November 26, 1968 and 
ratified by the UkrSSR on March 25, 1969 which provides that genocide is 
criminally punishable even if such acts do not: constitute a violation of the 
domestic law of the country in which they were committed (Article 1 of the 
Convention). 
As the Court stated, having reviewed the factual circumstances of the case set 
forth in the findings of the pre-trial investigatory body, "the conclusions set forth 
in these findings as to the commission, by Stalin (Dzhugasbvili), J.V., Molotov 
(Skriabin), V.M., Kaganovich, L.M. , Postyshev, P.P., Kossior, S.V., Chubar, V.Ya., 
and Khatayevich, M.M., of the crime correctly identified in accordance with section 
1, Article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine as genocide of a part of the 
Ukrainian national group, are substantiated and proven." 
The established factual circumstances of the case proved that the criminal 
actions of these persons were directed against the very existence of a part of the 
Ukrainian national group. The gathered and verified proofs confirmed that the 
conditions inflicted on the Ukrainian national group were meant to bring about its 
partial physical destruction by means of the Holodomor, which resulted in the 
extermination of 3 million 941 thousand people. 
Though the Court stated that there were no legal grounds for closing the 
criminal case due to the lack of the event of the crime or the absence, in the actions 
of J.V. Stalin (Dzhugashvili), V.M.Molotov (Skriabin), L .M. Kaganovich, P.P. 
Postyshev, S.V. Kossior, V.Ya. Chubar, and M M . Khatayevich, of the elements of 
the crime of genocide, the case was closed due to their death. However it's crucially 
important that the very fact of the Holodomor as a crime of genocide was proved 
by the Kyiv Court of Appeals both on the basis of Ukrailnian legislation and 
international, law. 
In general, the practice of enforcing the Genocide Convention in national 
courts testifies either to its direct application, or application of the relative norm 
on the crime of genocide in national legislation, formulated in accordance with the 
definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention or extendedly, or application 
of both sources. The establishment of effective enforcement: mechanisms for 
genocide among which national, courts prevail is in process, however this process 
is too slow and the perpetrators of the crime of genocide in many states remain 
unpunished. 
In this respect the establishment of the Platform of European Memory and 
Conscience in the frame of the EU was very important which called for the creation 
of a supranational judicial body for the gravest crimes committed by the Communist 
dictatorships.72 
IV. Application of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in National 
Jurisprudence 
Article 13 of the European Convention ensures that "Everyone whose rights 
and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity." As is clear from the travaux 
préparatoires,'3 the object of it is to provide a means whereby "individuals can 
obtain relief at national level for violations of their Convention rights before having 
to set in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court."74 The 
margin of appreciation recognizes that the solutions compatible with human rights 
may be available to the national authorities and ideally there should be appropriate 
procedures provided in domestic courts. For this European Convention should be 
used in national jurisprudence. As European states belong either to common law 
or continental law system, it would be interesting to compare how they apply the 
European Convention. Among states with continental law system CIS countries 
are most interesting as they started to cite the Convention not long ago while still 
undergoing constitutional reforms and being in transition from an authoritarian 
state to democratic states with the rule of law and independent judiciary. 
1. Common Law States Practice 
As stated above, courts of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia and other 
common law states apply only those international legal acts which are incorporated 
into national legislation through adopting relevant municipal acts. The European 
Convention was incorporated into domestic law of the United Kingdom by the 
Human Rights Act in 1998. Since then The European Convention is being cited in 
argument before domestic courts. The House of Lords has emphasized in Regina u 
A (2001), diat legislation must be construed and applied in appropriate cases under 
section 3, Human Rights Act 1998, and "so far as it is possible to do so, primary 
legislation . . . must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with die 
Convention rights."73 Hence die courts continue to develop the common law to ensure 
it is consistent with the European Convention. At the same time, courts can only 
make a declaration that primary legislation is incompatible with the European 
Convention, but they cannot strike it down. As a rule, Parliament will then amend the 
legislation to make it compatible with the Convention, but it is unlikely to do so 
retrospectively.76 
Similar practice of application of international treaties exists in Ireland. Though 
Ireland has ratified the European Convention and the ICCPR, until recendy they 
were not incoqjorated into domestic law primarily on the basis of the Constitution 
of Ireland. The Belfast Agreement of 1998 committed the Irish Government to 
"ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights" in the Republic 
of Ireland as would pertain in Northern Ireland after adopting 1998 Human Rights 
Act.'7 There were arguments against direct legislative incorporation of the European 
Convention into national legislation as "the margin of appreciation would move 
from the legislature to the judiciary because it: would be judges who would decide, 
in any given case, whether any law or state action fell within or without die terms 
of the Convention.78 In their torn Irish courts have refused to apply decisions of 
the ECHR even when the decision was made against Ireland. When Irish judges 
cited the European Convention it was only to provide additional back-up support 
for a decision of the domestic court.'9 
The European Convention was incorporated in Ireland by the 2001 European 
Convention on Human Rights Bill under which any statutory provision, defined in 
section 1 of diis Bill and any rule of law shall be interpreted, in so far as possible, in 
a manner compatible with the state's obligations under the Convention.80 This section 
applies retrospectively and prospectively. Under the European Convention ВІД all state 
organs (it is interesting that courts are excluded from them) shall perform their 
functions in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the European 
Convention. The Bill also provides for an ex gratia payment of compensation to an 
injured party by the Government, not by die courts, as the courts could not award 
damages where there was no violation of statutory provision or rule of law that, while 
incompatible with the European Convention, remains constitutionally valid in Ireland. 
Exclusion of courts from state organs is, as Murphy writes, a crucial omission of 
the Bill as many of the decisions handed down by the ECHR relate to issues of fair 
trial and due process, and it is in contrast widi the broad definition of "public 
authority" under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.8' Under the European 
Convention Bill Irish courts are not bound to apply decisions of the ECHR, however 
they are required to interpret any statutory provision or rule of law, in so far as possible, 
in a manner compatible with the obligations under the European Convention. Similar 
to the United Kingdom, where there is a declaration of incompatibility of the national 
legislation with the European Convention, judges have no power to strike down the 
legislation — this is the responsibility of the Dail / Parliament. 
The question remains concerning taking cases to the ECHR after the European 
Convention was incorporated into domestic legislation in common law states and 
thus "brought home." Domestic courts should cope with the cases concerning 
violation of rights provided in the Convention. Nevertheless, the number of case 
in ECHR against Great Britain and other states remains huge. 
2. CIS States Experience 
As G. Danilenko points out, the Russian Constitutional Court has developed 
an extensive jurisprudence based on international law, including the European 
Convention.82 Thus in the Case Concerning Certain Normative Acts of the City of Moscow 
and Some Other Regions,83 which dealt with attempts on the part of local authorities 
to reintroduce the residence permit practice, the Constitutional Court noted that 
the right to freedom of movement and the right to freely choose a place of 
temporary or permanent residence is guaranteed not only by the Constitution but 
also by the ICCPR (article 12), other international legal acts, including Protocol 4 
to the European Convention (article 2). 
If up to 2004 the Russian Constitutional Court had applied provisions of the 
European Convention, but mosdy without reference to the ECHR case law, there 
were significant changes in the Constitutional Court's practice since then. In its 
judgment of 5 February 2007 the Constitutional Court interpreted the status of 
the case law of the ECHR under article 15 (4) of the Constitution: the European 
Convention and "the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights — insofar 
as on the basis of generally recognized principles and norms of international law 
they give interpretation of the Convention concerning the guaranteed rights... — 
form part of die Russian legal system and thus shall be taken into account by die 
federal legislature... and by the law enforcement bodies."84 
What concerns the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, after promulgation 
of the Regulation No. 5 of October 2003 by the Plenum of the Supreme Court "On 
the Application by Courts of General Jurisdiction of die Generally-Recognized 
Principles and Norms of International Law and die International Treaties of the 
Russian Federation" the number of judgements of the Supreme Court in which the 
Court referred to the European Convention has not increased much — only in 32 
judgments out of 3,723 between 2004 and 2007.85 As Anton Burkov considers, only 
in cases where a national court actually referred to the jurisprudence of the ECHR is 
it possible to say that the court actually applied the European Convention.86 And as 
different from other countries of CIS, the jurisprudence of the district courts in 
Russian Federation seems to indicate a better understanding of the European 
Convention and the occasions when courts referred to the Convention were not 
exceptional.8' Nevertheless, Russian courts of general jurisdiction have much less 
experience in applying international law that the Constitutional Court of Russia. 
In Moldova the Plenary Supreme Court of Justice explained in 2000 that the 
European Convention should be applied directly by courts. However only in recent 
years ''the number of references to the Convention in court decisions has increased, 
mostly because of social pressure on the judiciary and the growing number of 
EuCrtHR decisions involving Moldova."88 These references mostly concern 
reopened proceedings after a judgment by the Strasbourg court, after cases have 
been stricken out by the Court following friendly settlements, or after unilateral 
declarations of the Government.89 Thus, in the case of Ciorap v. 1 'he Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and the Ministry of finance the Supreme Court of Justice found in its 
judgment that there was sufficient evidence to support the applicants allegations 
of torture, that the Prosecutor Office's investigation had been inefficient, and that 
there had been a violation of the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the 
European Convention.'*1 The applicant was awarded compensation which however 
was later found by Strasbourg Court to be inadequate and such decisions of 
domestic courts did not appear to be part of their consistent policy offering real 
remedies against breaches of the European Convention.91 
In Drugalev v. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance Case the 
applicant claimed and received compensation for having been held in inhuman and 
degrading conditions for about six months. The Chisinau Court of Appeal based 
its award of compensation on Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention.92 At 
the same time there were several cases in which the Supreme Court of justice 
overturned decisions of lower courts based on the European Convention and 
Protocols to it, in breach of the Convention.9' 
The Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan has also referred to the European 
Convention in its decisions. However in most cases the Constitutional Court 
elaborated an article of the Constitution by interpreting it in the light of article of 
the Convention. Thus in a case of Zulfugarov, the Constitutional Court held that the 
failure of the appeal instance court to notify Mr. Zulfugarov of the time and place 
of the judicial session violated his rights under Article 60 of the Constitution, and 
also referred to the European Convention's Article 6 (1), and cited Krcmdf decision 
of the ECHR. 9 4 There are also cases of application of the European Convention 
by district courts in Azerbaijan. 
In Georgia, between 1999 and 2004 there were 41 cases, in which Georgian 
courts referred to the European Convention provisions, and even in those cases, as 
K. Korkelia notes, reference was formal and did not have any influence on the 
outcome of the disputed case.95 Since then the situation with application of the 
European Convention has not improved much. Thus, in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia, Chamber for Civil, Commercial and Insolvency Cases 
no. A.558-A-17-08 dated 21 July 2008, the Supreme Court dismissed die applicants 
claim after winning the case in the ECHR and revealed a negative trend in terms 
of wholesale application of the European Convention by die Georgian courts.'"' 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Georgia declared that the ECHR had no 
competence to invalidate domestic laws or rulings of domestic courts by reason of 
their noncompliance with the European Convention.97 However, there are 
examples of accurate applications of the ECHR decisions by the Constitutional 
Court of Georgia in which the Court invoked the concept of 'public interest' in 
the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention.98 
3. Ukraine's Practice 
The norms of the European Convention have been used by Ukrainian courts 
of different levels and in different contexts. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
referred to the provisions of international treaties in more than a third of its 
decisions. Among cases concerning official interpretation of Constitutional 
provisions and laws of Ukraine initiated by individuals about 60% contain 
reference to international treaties including the European Convention while 
justifying legal positions of the Court.99 
Among the first cases in which the Constitutional Court relied on the European 
standards was the Case Concerning Articles 3, 23,31,47,48 of the Law of Ukraine 
on Information and Article 12 of the Law of Ukraine on the Procuracy initiated 
by a private person. K .G . Ustymenko. That case dealt with access to personal data 
concerning the psychiatric treatment of citizens. The Court found that in respect 
of protecting confidential data in the sphere of mental health the Ukrainian 
legislation failed to meet international standards. In particular, the Court noted diat 
"the Ukrainian legislation had not been brought into conformity with the European 
standards governing the protection of personal information and data".""'The Court 
referred to the 1977 Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe on the Situation of the Mentally 111."" 
In motivation part of the decision in the Residents of the City of Zhovti Vody on official 
interpretation of Articles55, 64, 124 of the Constitution of Ukraine Case the Constitutional 
Court of I kr.iitie stated, that "Part 1 of article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine 
corresponds to the obligations of Ukraine which appeared, in particular, after 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 1950), which 
under article 9 of the Constitution "constitute an integral part of the national 
legislation of Ukraine".1"2 
The Supreme Court of Ukraine also addresses provisions of the European 
Convention in decrees of Plenum of the Court. Thus in the Decree of Plenum No. 
5 adopted on 25 May 2001, "On Changes and Ammendments to the Decree No. 4 
of 31 March "On Judicial Practice in Cases of Compensation for Moral (Non-
Pecuniary) Damage" the Supreme Court ruled that though courts mainly correctly 
apply norms of the legislation on the right of physical and legal persons to 
compensation of moral (non-pecuniary) damage caused as a result of violation of 
their rights and freedoms and lawful interests, they rarely use international treaties in 
force, consented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Point 1 of the Decree No. 4 
was amended by paragraph 2 which lays down that in accordance with article 9 of 
the Constitution, international treaties in force are part of national legislation of 
Ukraine. In particular, the European Convention belongs to such treaties ratified by 
the Verkhovna Rada and is to be applied by domestic courts.103 
Courts of several regions of Ukraine have also referred to the norms of the 
European Convention. As stated by judge VP. Paliuk, the result of die theoretical and 
informational measures of the Council of Europe was the decision of the judicial 
collegium in civil cases of the Mykolaiv regional court which while hearing the 
cassation claim of T. and K. on the decision of the Pervomaisk city court of 6 May 
2000 relied on the provisions of article 10 of the European Convention and on the 
decision of the ECHR in Ungens v. Austria Case.1"4 While hearing the case on the claim 
of K.A. on the Ruling of the Circuit Election Commission of die Circuit 133 
(Mykolaiv region) at the elections of the people's deputies (members of Parliament) 
of Ukraine, die Court applied provisions on fair trial of article 6 of the European 
Convention.105 
In general, the court practice of application of international human rights 
instruments is far from being effective in Ukraine. The reasons for this are both 
subjective (unpreparedness of judges, problems with legal education etc.) and 
objective. Until the judicial reform is conducted in Ukraine the situation is not likely 
to change substantially. 
V. Conclusions 
Though numerous international human rights instruments were concluded and 
international, judicial and control bodies were established for the protection of 
international human rights and freedoms their ensuring remains predominancy the 
inner matter of states. The role of domestic courts in this respect should be decisive 
as international human rights treaties were adopted with the main aim of obliging 
states to fulfil their human rights obligations and their efficacy depends upon their 
application by national courts. At the same time inner courts may refer to 
international human rights instruments only in case the state legal system foresees 
the validity of international treaties in the territory of the state. In most states there 
should be implementation of international human rights treaties into national 
legislation for their application by domestic courts. 
The court practice of states on application of international human rights 
instruments is very different - from their direct application, direct application of only 
self-executing treaties to application of only those international treaties which were 
duly incorporated into national legislation, by adopting appropriate national law. 
The analysis of the municipal courts' practice of application of such important 
international human rights instruments as the Genocide Convention and the 
European Convention proves that domestic courts may either refer to the norms of 
appropriate national legislation or the international norms. They might also parallelly 
apply both sources of law as the court practice of Ukraine and other states prove. 
Such parallel application of international and domestic legal norms is mostly used in 
newly independent states which undergo transformation of their legal systems and 
are in the process of harmonization of national and international law systems. The 
case law of Ukraine and other former Soviet Union republics concerning application 
of international human rights instruments is in the process of establishing. 
All in all, the practice of application of international human rights instruments 
by domestic courts lags behind constitutional provisions of states. It concerns even 
those European states which have ratified the European Convention over sixty 
years ago and have recognized its direct application. The European Convention 
remains the subsidiary source of law and the constitutional norms have priority. 
On the other hand, there is a clear tendency towards more active application of 
international legal acts by domestic courts which corresponds to the tendency of 
growing of the role of national courts in functioning of international law. 


